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I. INTRODUCTION: THE JUDICIAL POWER TO ESTABLISH AND DEVELOP THE
COMMON LAW
The Michigan Constitution provides for separation of powers,1 and
further provides that the judicial power of the state is vested exclusively in
one court of justice.2 A major component ofjudicial power is the authority
of the courts to establish and develop the common law of the state. This has
been the traditional function of the courts in the Anglo-American legal
system, and the common law has often been described as "judge-made law."
At the same time, the legislature has the power to change the common law
by legislation and thus has the ultimate responsibility to determine the law
of the state.3 But in the absence of legislation changing the
t Distinguished Professor of Law, Wayne State University. A.B., 1956; J.D., 1959,
University of Pittsburgh.
1. MICH. CONST. art III, § 2.
2. MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 1.
3. See the classic discussion of legislative power in Bowerman v. Sheehan, 242 Mich.
95, 98, 219 N.W. 69, 70 (1928) (citations omitted). The court there stated:
The legislature may alter or repeal the common law. It may create new offenses,
enlarge the scope of civil remedies, and fasten responsibility for injuries upon
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common law, it is the common law that determines the legal rights and
obligations of private persons, and the largest part of private law in
Michigan and elsewhere is the common law.4
persons against whom the common law gives no remedy .... A person has no
property, no vested interest, in any rule of the common law. That is only one of
the forms of municipal law, and is no more sacred than any other. Rights of
property which have been created by the common law cannot be taken away
without due process; but the law itself, as a rule of conduct, may be changed at the
will * * * of the Legislature, unless prevented by constitutional limitations.
Indeed, the great office of statutes is to remedy defects in the common law as they
are developed, and to adapt it to the changes of time and circumstances.
Id.
In that case, the court upheld the power of the legislature to impose liability against an
automobile owner for harm caused by members of his immediate family.
A good example of legislative power to change the common law in Michigan is the
matter of governmental tort immunity. While the Michigan Supreme Court has abolished
the common law doctrine of governmental tort immunity, see Williams v. City of Detroit,
364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d 1 (1961); Pittman v. City of Taylor, 398 Mich. 41,247 N.W.2d
512 (1976), the Michigan Legislature has enacted a comprehensive statute regulating the tort
liability of governmental entities and their employees. IICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§
691.1401-. 1415(West 2000 & Supp. 2007).. See Thomas v. State Highway Dept., 398 Mich.
1, 247 N.W.2d 530 (1976).
Roscoe Pound, one of the Nation's foremost legal scholars, has explained the
relationship between the common law and legislation in terms of the common law as being
the traditional element of the law and legislation as being the enacted or imperative element
of the law. Pound saw these elements as being closely interrelated.
Over time, Pound explained, as judicial experience develops the common law into
clear principles, these principles are incorporated into legislative rules, which in
the process of time become absorbed into the legal system and are themselves
interpreted and developed by the common law, which fills the gaps in legislation
and further develops the principles of legislation.
NEIL HAMILTON & MATHIAS ALFRED JAREN, INTRODUCTION TO ROSCOE POUND, THE
SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW xxxiii (Transaction ed. 1999). The authors cited to Roscoe
Pound, Theories of Law, 22 YALE L.J. 114, 143 (1912). This book, a seminal work on the
common law, was first published in 1921 and was based on the lectures that Pound delivered
at Dartmouth College in the summer of that year.
4. The common law in force at the time of the 1963 Constitution remains in force unless
and until it is changed by legislation or judicial decision. MICH. CONST. art III, § 7. See
Myers v. Genesee County Auditor, 375 Mich. 1, 7, 133 N.W.2d 190, 191 (1965). This
provision traces back to Michigan's first Constitution of 1835, where it was provided that,
"[a]ll laws now in force in the territory of Michigan, which are not repugnant to this
constitution, shall remain in force until they expire by their own limitations, or be altered
or repealed by the legislature." MICH. CONST. art. XIII, sched. 2 (1835). It has been assumed
that the reference to [a]ll laws now in force" included the common law, and following
statehood, the newly-established state courts applied the common law in the same manner
as it had been applied by the territorial courts prior to statehood.
The Michigan Supreme Court has recently observed that, "Michigan courts have
uniformly held that legislative amendment of the common law is not lightly presumed."
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There is now a question in Michigan as to whether separation of powers
considerations should impose significant limits on the power of the courts
to establish and develop the common law of Michigan. Specifically, the
question is whether the courts should be constrained by separation of
powers considerations from engaging in what has been called judicial
policymaking in formulating common law rules. The proposition, set forth
in Justice Corrigan's opinion for the Michigan Supreme Court in Henry v.
Dow Chemical Co.,5 and in a law review article by Michigan Supreme
Court Justice Robert P. Young, Jr.,6 is that policymaking is exclusively the
province of the legislature, so that the courts cannot formulate common law
rules that may have significant social and economic effects, and that the
courts should not make a "new and potentially societally dislocating change
to the common law."7 Justice Corrigan stated:
In certain instances, the principle of separation of powers is an
affirmative constitutional bar on policy-making by this Court. In
other cases, however, the separation of powers considerations may
operate as a prudential bar to judicial policy-making in the
common-law arena. This is so when we are asked to modify the
common law in a way that may lead to dramatic reallocation of
societal benefits and burdens.8
Similarly, as Justice Young has stated:
[T]he judiciary is largely institutionally incompetent--or at the
very least, severely "challenged"-to make sound policy choices.
Because the executive and legislative branches are specifically
Wold Architects and Engineers v. Strat, 474 Mich. 223,233, 713 N.W.2d 750, 756 (2006).
In Michigan, as elsewhere, it is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that,
"statutes in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed .... and will not be
extended by implication to abrogate established rules of common law." Theophelis v.
Lansing General Hosp., 430 Mich. 473,488,424 N.W.2d 478,484-85 (1988). In Theophelis
the court held that a 1974 amendment to the Michigan contribution among joint tortfeasors
act did not abrogate the common law rule that settlement with, and release of, an agent
operates to discharge the principal from vicarious liability for the agent's acts. Id. at 491,
424 N.W.2d at 486; MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 600.2925d (West 2000).
5. 473 Mich. 63, 701 N.W.2d 684 (2005).
6. Robert P. Young, Jr., State Jurisprudence, the Role of the Courts and the Rule of
Law, 8 TEX. REV. LAW & POL. 299 (2004).
7. Henry, 473 Mich. at 89, 701 N.W.2d at 697.
8. Id. (footnotes omitted).
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designed to create policy, it is entirely desirable, and most
consistent with our constitutional values, that important public and
social policy be made by these political branches of government
instead of the judiciary.9
Justice Young appears to be going even beyond prudential considerations
to constitutional limitations, maintaining that, "[t]his modem conception of
the common law that authorizes jurists to discover, create, or modify
common-law rules-or policy-is entirely inconsistent with normative
constitutional policies and principles, according to which prerogatives of
policymaking are given to other branches of government.""°
The author strongly disagrees with the proposition that there is any kind
of constitutional constraint, either prudential or structural, on the power and
indeed the constitutional responsibility of the Michigan courts to engage in
judicial policymaking in the process of formulating common law rules. The
judicial power given to the Michigan courts by the Michigan Constitution
includes the power to do what courts have always done in the Anglo-
American legal system. The judicial power gives the courts the
responsibility to adjudicate controversies between private persons and in the
process to develop a common law through the workings of binding
precedent and stare decisis. In so doing, the courts may properly take into
account considerations of social and economic policy just as the legislature
does when it engages in the process of enacting legislation. The difference
between what the courts do and what the legislature does is a difference in
process, not a difference in substance." Judicial policymaking
9. Young, supra note 6, at 304.
10. Id. at 302.
11. In his classic work on judicial decision-making, United States Supreme Court
Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo carefully delineated the similarities and differences between
legislative and judicial activity. BENJAMIN N. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS 119-20 (Yale University Press) (1921) (basing this book on the Storrs Lectures
delivered at Yale University in 1921 when Justice Cardozo was a Judge of the New York
Court of Appeals). He says that, "Everywhere there is a growing emphasis on the analogy
between the function of the judge and the function of the legislator." He then says that this
analogy has been developed by the French legal philosopher Francois Geny "with boldness
and power," and goes on to quote extensively from Geny's work:
A priori the process of research (1a recherche), which is imposed upon the judge
in finding the law seems to us very analogous to that incumbent on the legislator
himself. Except for this circumstance, certainly not negligible, and yet of
secondary importance, that the process is set in motion by some concrete
situations, and in order to adapt the law to that situation, the considerations which
ought to guide it are, in respect of the final end to be attained, exactly of the same
nature as those which ought to dominate legislative action itself, since it is a
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question in each case, of satisfying, as best may be, justice and social utility by an
appropriate rule. Hence, I will not hesitate in the silence or inadequacy of formal
sources, to indicate as the general line of direction for the judge the following: that
he sought to shape his judgment of the law in obedience to the same aims which
would be those of a legislator who was proposing to himself to regulate the
question. None the less, an important distinction separates here judicial from
legislative activity. While the legislator is not hampered by any limitations in the
appreciation of a general situation, which he regulates in a manner altogether
abstract, the judge, who decides in view of particular cases, and with reference to
problems absolutely concrete, ought, in adherence to the spirit of our modern
organization, and in order to escape the dangers of arbitrary action, to disengage
himself, so far as possible, of every influence that is personal or that comes from
the particular situation which is presented to him, and base his judicial decision
on elements of an objective nature. And that is why the activity which is proper
to him has seemed to me capable of being justly qualified: free scientific research,
libre recherche scientifique: free, since it is removed from the action of positive
authority; scientific, at the same time, because it can find its solid foundations
only in the objective elements which science alone is able to reveal to it.
METHODE D'INTERPRETATION ET SOURCES EN DROIT PRIVE POSITIF, vol. II, 77 (Penguin
Modern Legal Philosophy Series) (transl. 1919).
Cardozo also compared the differences between how the judge and the legislator went
about balancing the social interest served by symmetry or certainty against the social interest
served by equity and fairness or other elements of social welfare. He stated as follows:
If you ask how he is to know when one interest outweighs another, I can only
answer he must get his knowledge just as the legislator gets it, from experience
and study and reflection; in brief, from life itself. Here, indeed, is the point of
contact between the legislator's work and his. The choice of methods, the
appraisement of values, must in the end be guided by like considerations for the
one as for the other. Each indeed is legislating within the limits of his competence.
No doubt the limits for the judge are narrower. He legislates only between gaps.
He fills the open spaces in the law. How far he may go without traveling beyond
the walls of the interstices cannot be staked out for him upon a chart. He must
learn it for himself as he gains the sense of fitness and proportion that comes with
years of habitude in the practice of an art. Even within the gaps, restrictions not
easy to define, but felt, however, impalpable they may be, by every judge and
lawyer, hedge and circumscribe his action. They are established by the traditions
of the centuries, by the example of other judges, his predecessors and his
colleagues, by the collective judgment of the profession, and by the duty of
adherence to the pervading spirit of the law.
CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 11, at 113-14.
Cardozo concludes by emphasizing the limitations imposed on a judge by the judicial
process itself:
The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not to innovate at
pleasure. He is not a knight-errant roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of
beauty or of goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from consecrated principles.
He is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to a vague and unregulated
benevolence. He is to exercise a discretion informed by tradition, methodized by
analogy, disciplined by system, and subordinated to 'the primordial necessity of
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takes place within the judicial process, that is, in the adjudication of
controversies between persons in which the courts promulgate common law
rules. The common law develops in a line of growth through the workings
of binding precedent and stare decisis, and to the extent that there are
limitations on the development of the common law, these are limitations
that inhere in the judicial process itself. 2 When the courts, for example,
consider whether a new claim or a new defense should be recognized by the
common law, they must consider whether that new claim or defense
properly follows in the line of growth from existing doctrine and
precedent. 3 But if the courts conclude that it does, that is, if the claim or
defense is consistent with the line of growth of existing doctrine and
precedent, then the courts are not constrained from recognizing the claim
or defense on the ground that the substance of the claim or defense is a
matter for the legislature, rather than for the courts, or that the resulting
order in the social life.' Wide enough in all conscience is the field of discretion
that remains.'
Id. at 140-41 (citation omitted).
12. As Pound has observed:
The doctrine of precedents means that causes are to be judged by principles
reached inductively from the judicial experience of the past, not by deduction
established arbitrarily by sovereign will. In other words, reason, not arbitrary will
is to be the ultimate ground of decision... The common-law doctrine is one of
reason applied to experience. It assumes that experience will afford the most
satisfactory foundation for standards of action and principles of decision. It holds
that law is not to be made arbitrarily by a fiat of sovereign will, but is to be
discovered by judicial and juristic experience of the rules and principles which in
the past have accomplished or failed to accomplish justice. Where such a doctrine
obtains, not merely the interpretation and application of legal rules but in large
measure the ascertainment of them must be left to the disciplined reason of the
judges, and we must find in the criticism of the reported decision by bench and bar
in other cases our assurance that they will be governed by reason and that the
personal equation of the individual judge will be suppressed. The vitality of the
common law and the steady increase in the value attributed to judicial decisions
in the rest of the world attest the soundness of this explanation.
HAMILTON & JAREN, SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW, supra note 3, at 182-83.
13. See the discussion of the function of precedent in the judicial decision making in
CARDOzO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 11, at 113-14. at 149-52.
Cardozo maintains that adherence to precedent should be the rule and not the exception, but
that:
[T]here should be greater rediness to abandon an untenable position when the rule
to be discarded may not reasonably be supposed to have determined the conduct
of the litigants, and particularly when in its origin it was the product of institutions
or conditions which have gained a new significance or development with the
progress of the years.
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common law rule may have significant social and economic effects.
The legislature, in contrast, enacts legislation through the legislative
process. That process is a freewheeling one, often dependent on political
compromise and completely unrestrained by the kind of limitations that
inhere in the judicial process. There is no legislative concept of line of
growth, and the legislature can and often does enact legislation that brings
about fundamental societal change or reverses the course of public policy.
In our constitutional system, the most important questions of public policy
are, of course, determined by the legislature. 4  Where the
14. Because this is so, a court may be reluctant to formulate a common law rule
involving important considerations of public policy where it is not absolutely necessary for
the court to do so. This situation was presented in a case before a Michigan federal court,
Odgers v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 609 F.Supp. 867 (E.D.Mich. 1985), in which the federal
court certified an uncertain question of Michigan law to the Michigan Supreme Court. That
question was whether the manufacturer of an oral contraceptive, which is a prescription
drug, in addition to its duty under the common law of Michigan to warn physicians of any
risks inherent in the use of the oral contraceptive, had an additional common law duty to
provide adequate warnings directly to the users of the oral contraceptives. Odgers, 609
F.Supp. at 868-69. However, in In re Certified Questions, a divided Michigan Supreme
Court held 4-3, that it would refuse to answer a question certified to it by a federal court in
Michigan as to whether a manufacturer of prescription drugs has a duty to disclose the risks
and side effects of the drugs directly to the patient. 419 Mich. 686, 358 N.W.2d 873 (1984).
Writing for the majority, Justice Levin maintained that:
The allocation of the duty to warn patients is a public policy question involving
the marketing system and economics of a major industry and the everyday
practice of an essential profession. We believe that the Legislature is in a better
position to allocate those duties. If, because of legislative inaction, this Court is
constrained to make the choices necessary for deciding this question, it would be
better to do so in a case where the factual record is fully developed, and where the
history of proceedings in the courts of this state provide more assurance than the
records of these proceedings that the decision of the Court responds to all the
issues implicated by the questions posed.
Id. at 691-92, 358 N.W.2d at 874. Thus, the Michigan Supreme Court advised the federal
court that the Michigan courts have announced no rule of law on the certified questions. The
dissenting justices, in an opinion by Justice Boyle, maintained that the court could decide
the questions on the basis of the record and would have promulgated the following common
law rule: in addition to its duty to warn the prescribing physician, the manufacturer of an
oral contraceptive has a duty to warn the user directly of known hazards, but the
manufacturer of a therapeutic, diagnostic or curative drug does not have this additional duty.
Id. at 699, 358 N.W.2d at 878. It should be noted that Justice Levin, writing for the Court,
recognized that where the legislature had not acted on an important matter of public policy,
the courts had the power to do so by way of a common law rule. His point was that the Court
should not do so in the context of answering a certified question instead of in the context of
resolving an actual case where the question was directly presented.
However, the luxury of avoiding a decision on what the rule of Michigan law was in
this case was not open to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW
legislature disagrees with the policy choices reflected in a common law rule,
the legislature has the power to enact legislation changing the common law
rule. But there are many areas of private law where the legislature has not
acted. In our constitutional system, where the matter in issue is not covered
or preempted by legislation, the courts may formulate a common law rule
to cover that matter, and in so doing may engage in judicial policymaking.
Judicial policymaking is a part of the development of the common law, and
the courts cannot avoid their responsibility to engage in judicial
policymaking to the extent that it is necessary in the process of formulating
the common law. As a constitutional matter, there are no separation of
powers considerations that prohibit the courts from engaging in judicial
policymaking.
Considerations of separation of powers do constrain the power of the
courts to formulate common law rules in two ways. First, and most
obviously, since under the Michigan Constitution legislation takes
precedence over the common law, the courts may not formulate a common
law rule that expressly conflicts with the provisions of legislation. 15 Second,
Michigan. That court did have to resolve an actual case where the question was directly
presented and so had to make a determination of Michigan law on the point in issue. Since
a federal court sitting in diversity must apply the law of the state in which it sits as declared
by the highest state court, Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), it follows that the
primary responsibility for determining the law of Michigan in this case fell on the Michigan
Supreme Court, not on the federal court that certified the question of Michigan law to the
Michigan Supreme Court. The Michigan Supreme Court refused to exercise that
responsibility, knowingfull well that in this case thefederal court would have to decide what
the rule of Michigan law was. In every sense, the refusal of the Michigan Supreme Court to
answer the certified question in this case was an abdication of the state court's responsibility
to declare the law of the state and is inconsistent with the function of a state's highest court
in the American federal system.
When the case was returned to the federal district court with the state law question
unanswered, the federal judge by necessity was compelled to make an "educated guess" and
predict how the Michigan Supreme Court would decide this question if it were presented to
it in the future. Federal District Judge Avern Cohn made this prediction in light of "the
policies involved in this litigation under the facts of the present case." Odgers, 609 F.Supp.
at 869. In a very careful and precise analysis of the issue from this perspective, Judge Cohn,
emphasizing, as did the dissenting Justices in Certified Questions, the fact that the patient
rather than the physician made the primary choice whether or not to obtain a prescription for
an oral contraceptive, predicted that "the Michigan Supreme Court would impose the duty
on the manufacturer of an oral contraceptive to warn consumers directly of the possible side
effects associated with their use when required to decide this issue." Id. at 872.
15. Legislation and the common law may interact with each other. The common law,
of course, applies to cases arising before the effective date of legislation. However, the
courts have the discretion to apply the provisions of the new legislation to those cases as a
common law rule in the absence of any issue of detrimental reliance on the former common
law rule. See e.g., Kovacs v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 426 Mich. 647,397 N.W.2d 169
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the courts may not properly formulate a common law rule in an area that has
been effectively preempted by legislation, even though the common law
rule does not expressly conflict with the legislation.' 6 An example of
preemption in Michigan is in the area of liability of a bar owner for harm
caused by serving liquor to an intoxicated patron. The Michigan Supreme
Court has found that the legislature has enacted a comprehensive dram shop
act designed to change the common law rule of nonliability of the bar owner
for harm caused by intoxicated patrons. '7 The act provides for recovery
against the bar owner by all persons injured by the intoxicated patron,
including the patron's spouse, child, parent or guardian. 18 But the act does
not provide for recovery against the bar owner by the intoxicated patron
herself on a theory of gross negligence or wilful misconduct. 9 The
Michigan Supreme Court has found that "the Legislature intended the
dramshop act to be a complete and self-contained solution to a social
problem not adequately addressed at common law."2 Thus, the dram shop
(1986). In that case, the court relied on the fact that the newly enacted statute regulating
damages for wrongful death reduced future damages to present value by a 5% factor to reject
the defendant's argument that the court should use a 12% factor. In addition, since the
legislation did not provide that the jury should be informed that the award was not subject
to income tax, the court would not consider the defendant's argument that it be so instructed.
Id. at 649-50, 397 N.W.2d at 169-70.
Conversely, the legislature may enact legislation codifying a common law rule, as it
did with respect to the former doctrine of governmental immunity (see Pittman v. City of
Taylor, 398 Mich. 41, 247 N.W.2d 512 (1976)), and with respect to the adoption of a rule
of comparative negligence in place of contributory negligence. See Placek v. City of Sterling
Heights, 405 Mich. 638,275 N.W.2d 511 (1979), and the discussion, infra, notes 53, 57, and
accompanying text.
16. Jackson v. PKM Corp., 430 Mich. 262, 422 N.W.2d 657 (1988).
17. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 436.1801 (West 2001).
18.Id.
19. Id.
20. Browder v. Int'l. Fidelity Ins. Co., 413 Mich. 603, 615, 321 N.W.2d 668, 675
(1982). In that case, the court held that the dramshop act's two year statute of limitations
applied in an action against the bar owner's insurer for injuries caused by an intoxicated
patron of the bar, and that the plaintiff could not bring her claim under the six year statute
of limitations for contract actions by characterizing her claim as one in contract as the third
party beneficiary of the insurance contract between the bar and the insurer. Id. at 616, 321
N.W.2d at 675. Similarly, in Millross v. Plum Hollow Golf Club, the court held that the
dramshop act preempts negligence claims based the furnishing of liquor to an intoxicated
person, such as a claim of negligent supervision of an employee who became intoxicated at
a function he was required to attend by his employer. 429 Mich. 178, 183, 413 N.W.2d 17,
19 (1987). It observed that "[i]n general, where comprehensive legislation prescribes in
detail a course of conduct to pursue and the parties and things affected,. . . the Legislature
will be found to have intended that the statute supersede and replace the common law
dealing with the subject matter." Id.
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act has effectively preempted the area of the bar owner's liability for harm
caused by the serving of liquor to an intoxicated patron, and since the act
does not allow recovery against the bar owner by the intoxicated patron
herself, the courts cannot formulate a common law rule allowing such
recovery.21 However, where the substance of the matter in issue is not
21. Jackson, 430 Mich. 262, 422 N.W.2d 657. The dramshop act does not preempt a
common law claim against a bar owner unrelated to the furnishing of liquor to an intoxicated
person, such as a claim of negligence in failing to maintain a suitable place and safe
conditions for business invitees. Manual v. Weitzman, 386 Mich. 157, 164-65, 191 N.W.2d
474, 477 (1971). In that case, liability was based on the failure of the bar owner to prevent
an intoxicated patron from assaulting another patron. Id. at 160, 191 N.W.2d 475. See also
Mann v. Shusteric Enterprises, 470 Mich. 320, 683 N.W.2d 573 (2004) (holding that
although the dramshop act did not preempt a common law claim for negligence against a bar
owner by an intoxicated patron who suffered injury after slipping and falling in the bar's
parking lot, the bar's knowledge of the patron's intoxication was not relevant on the issue
of whether the bar breached its duty to protect the patron against the ice and snow in the
parking lot).
In contrast, the Michigan dog bite statute, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 287.351 (West
2003), has been held not to preempt a common law action for negligence against the dog
owner. Nicholes v. Lorenz, 396 Mich. 53, 59-60, 237 N.W.2d 468,470 (1976). Instead, the
court found that the legislature intended to provide alternative means of recovery for harm
caused by dog bites. Id. The dog bite statute imposes strict liability except where the dog has
been provoked, in which case there is no liability. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 287.351. The
claim for common law negligence is available where recovery cannot be had under the
statute because the dog has been provoked (the provocation barring recovery can be
unintentional), but the owner has been negligent and the plaintiff's recovery will be reduced
by the plaintiff's comparative fault, if any. Hill v. Hoig, 258 Mich. App. 538, 540-41, 672
N.W.2d 531, 532-33 (2003). The Michigan Supreme Court has recently held that the
Michigan Arbitration Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5001 (West 2000), did not
preempt common law arbitration in Michigan, and that when the parties' agreement to
arbitrate does not comply with statutory requirements, the parties are deemed to have agreed
to a common law arbitration. Wold Architects and Engineers v. Strat, 474 Mich. 223, 713
N.W.2d 750 (2006).
In Van v. Zahorik, a sharply divided Michigan Supreme Court held in a 4-3 decision
that the Child Custody Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 722.21-.31 (West 2002), occupied
the field of child custody to the extent of precluding the court from recognizing as a matter
of common law a claim of equitable parenthood or equitable estoppel, asserted by a person
with a longstanding relationship to a child, but who was not a biological or legal parent of
the child and who was not related by marriage to the child's biological parent. 460 Mich.
320, 597 N.W.2d 15 (1999). The court concluded that the legislature had provided a
comprehensive statutory scheme to deal with all issues relating to child custody in the act,
and that, "in the context of a subject matter fraught with public policy implications and the
Legislature's occupation of the field of child custody with the promulgation of the Child
Custody Act .... [t]he creation and extension of rights relating to child custody matters is
clearly the province of the Legislature, not the judiciary."Id., 460 Mich. at 330, 597 N.W.2d
at 20. The dissenting justices argued that the Child Custody Act did not "supplant or preempt
the subject of visitation or the equitable powers of the circuit court to determine visitation
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covered by or preempted by legislation, the courts may properly formulate
a common law rule covering that matter, and in so doing, they may make
policy determinations.
The history of the development of the common law in the United States
has been a history of judicial policymaking. The role of judicial
policymaking in the development of the common law has been expounded
many years ago by the venerated jurist Oliver Wendell Holmes in his classic
work, THE COMMON LAW. Holmes begins the book by discussing the role
of experience and public policy in "the life of the Law."
The life of the Law has not been logic: it has been experience. The
felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political
theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even
the prejudices which judges share with their fellow men, have had
a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules
by which men should be governed."2
In commenting on this passage Harvard Professor Mark De Wolfe Howe,
who edited the 1963 edition of The Common Law, observed that: "[e]arly
in the 1870's [Holmes] had come to recognize the sterility of ajurisprudence
that disregards the social, psychological, and moral conditions from which
the law draws its vivifying juices."23 In Holmes' view, whenever a jurist
was concerned with the formulation of new rules of law or with the
enforcement of inherited doctrine, the critical question for the jurist should
be "[w]hat rule of law will best serve the interests of this society?"24
Holmes went on to discuss the role of public policy in the development
of the common law and the similarity between the common law and
legislation in terms of public policy. Holmes stated:
In substance the growth of the law is legislative. And this in a
deeper sense than that what the courts declare to have always been
the law is in fact new. It is legislative in its grounds. The very
under circumstances not expressly included within the statute." Id. at 340, 597 N.W.2d at
25. (Brickley, J., dissenting). This being so, the dissent argued that the courts were not
precluded from extending equitable parenthood to a person who acted as the children's
parent in the erroneous belief that he was their biological father. Id. at 345, 597 N.W.2d at
27 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
22. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1963)
(1881). THE COMMON LAW was originally published in 1881. It consists of eleven lectures
that Holmes delivered at the Lowell Institute in Boston.
23. Id. at xxiii.
24. Id.
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considerations which judges most rarely mention, and always with
an apology, are the secret root from which the law draws all the
juices of life. I mean, of course, considerations of what is expedient
for the community concerned. Every important principle which is
developed by litigation is in fact and at bottom the result of more
or less definitely understood views ofpublic policy; most generally,
to be sure, under our practices and traditions, the unconscious result
of instinctive preferences and inarticulate traditions, but none the
less traceable to views of public policy in the last analysis.
2 5
As the above discussion makes clear, when courts today engage in what has
been called judicial policymaking, they are doing exactly what Holmes said
that courts did and should do in the performance of the judicial function to
establish and develop the common law.26
25. Id. at 32. Holmes insists that there should be a conscious recognition of the
legislative function of the courts, and that the law "is always approaching, and never
reaching consistency."
"It is forever adopting new principles from life at one end, and it always retains
old ones from history at the other, which have not yet been absorbed or sloughed
off. It will become entirely consistent only when it ceases to grow. However much
we may codify the law into a series of seemingly self-sufficient propositions,
those propositions will be but a phase in a continuous growth."
Id.
26. Holmes' views on the common law and judicial policymaking were echoed in later
years by Pound and Cardozo. Pound referred to judicial empiricism, stating as follows:
The infusion of morals into the law through the development of equity was not an
achievement of legislation, it was the work of the courts. The absorption of the
usages of merchants into the law was not brought about by statutes but by judicial
decisions. When once the current ofjuristic thought and judicial decision is turned
into the new course our Anglo-American method of judicial empiricism has
always proved adequate. Given new premises, our common law has the means of
developing them to meet the exigencies ofjustice and of molding the results into
a scientific system. Moreover, it has the power of acquiring new premises, as it
did in the development of equity and the absorption of the law merchant. Indeed
fundamental changes in our legal system almost unnoticed, and a shifting was in
progress in our case law from the individualist justice of the nineteenth century,
which has passed so significantly by the name of legal justice, to the social justice
of today even before the change in our legislative policy became so marked.
HAMILTON & JAREN, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW, supra note 3, at 184-85.
Cardozo advocated the use of what he called the method of sociology in judicial
decision. As he stated:
Insignificant is the power of innovation of any judge, when compared with the
bulk and pressure of rules that hedge him on every side. Innovate, however, to
some extent he must, for with new conditions, there must be new rules. All that
the method of sociology demands is that within this narrow range of choice he
[Vol. 53:153
2007] CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS & THE COMMON LAW 165
II. JUDICIAL POLICYMAKING AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMON
LAW IN MICHIGAN
A. Liability-Limiting Rules
Perhaps the clearest historical example ofjudicial policymaking in the
development of the common law is the liability-limiting rules of the late
nineteenth century that were promulgated in the wake of the Industrial
Revolution to protect the newly-emerging industries. 7 The general
principles of the common law imposed liability for negligence based on the
three elements of breach of duty, causation, and harm. The courts grafted
on to these general principles liability-limiting rules such as assumption of
risk, contributory negligence, and the fellow servant doctrine, all of which
had the effect of denying recovery to workers and other victims of industrial
negligence. In speaking of the origins of doctrine of contributory
negligence, for example, former Michigan Supreme Court Justice G.
Mennan Williams observed:
Basically, the commentators have agreed that the most plausible
explanation for the origin of the doctrine was the period of
individualism and rapid development known as the Industrial
Revolution. The policy, it is said, was designed to protect infant
industries "from oversympathetic juries who regarded these
corporation defendants as intruders, as well as immensely rich."28
Similarly when the Michigan Supreme Court abandoned the common law
shall search for social justice.
CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 11, at 136-37.
27. Judicial policymaking at this point in time was also found in the numerous
decisions of the Michigan Supreme Court refusing to enforce certain contracts on the ground
that they were "void as a matter of public policy." See, e.g., Jordan v. Westerman, 62 Mich.
170, 28 N.W. 826 (1886) (refusing to enforce contract by which lawyers would receive a
share of alimony awarded in divorce proceeding); McNamara v. Gargett, 68 Mich. 454, 36
N.W. 218 (1888) (refusing to enforce contract containing illegal consideration); Case v.
Smith, 107 Mich. 416, 65 N.W. 279 (1895) (refusing to enforce promissory note issued in
exchange for promise to conceal from public fact that maker's spouse has been guilty of
adultery); Vreeland v. Turner, 117 Mich. 366, 75 N.W. 937 (1898) (refusing to enforce
contract under which one of the creditors of an insolvent estate withdrew his assistance from
a suit brought by all the creditors upon the insolvent's promise to pay his claim); Conklin
v. Conklin, 165 Mich. 571, 131 N.W. 154 (1911) (denying contract by which parties agreed
to try to persuade a court that a will was valid when they believed that it was invalid).
28. Kirby v. Larson, 400 Mich. 585, 622, 256 N.W.2d 400, 418 (1977) (Opinion of
Williams, J.).
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doctrine of assumption of risk, the court noted that when the doctrine was
first developed in the nineteenth century, "it was applied as a matter of
judicial policy to negate an employer's liability for injuries incurred by his
employees normally from dangers incident to the work in which engaged."29
In the area of the employer's liability for employee injuries, the
Michigan Legislature dramatically changed the common law rule by its
enactment of a workers' compensation law in 1912, and in so doing, it
abolished the defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and
the fellow servant rule that had been used to deny recovery by the employee
against the employer.3°
B. The Expansion of Tort Liability in Michigan
Beginning in the middle of the twentieth century, the Michigan
Supreme Court, exercising its constitutional power to make changes in the
common law, expanded significantly the scope of tort liability in
Michigan. 31 Emphasizing that "rules created by the court could be altered
by the court," and that the court had a "corrective responsibility" when
dealing with judge-made law,32 the court, in approximately a thirty year
period: eliminated the imputed negligence doctrine, under which the
driver's negligence was imputed to the passenger in the passenger's suit
against a third party;33 eliminated charitable immunity as a defense to a tort
action;34 held that a wife could maintain at tort action for loss of her
29. Felgner v. Anderson, 375 Mich. 23, 32, 133 N.W.2d 136, 141 (1964). During this
time, the court also invoked policy considerations in deciding some other questions of tort
law, such as its holding that tort actions between spouses were barred by spousal immunity,
Bandfield v. Bandfield, 117 Mich. 80, 75 N.W.2d 287 (1898), and holding that a parent's
alleged negligence in looking after a child would not be imputed to the child in the child's
negligence action against a third party tortfeasor, Battishill v. Humphreys, 64 Mich. 494, 31
N.W. 894 (1887).
30. See the discussion in Feigner, 375 Mich. at 23, 133 N.W.2d at 146. Many years
after the abolition of the fellow servant rule, the Michigan Supreme Court concluded that
the volunteer doctrine, under which the only duty owed to a volunteer was to refrain from
inflicting wilful or wanton injury, was related to the fellow servant rule and was designed
to place the volunteer under disabilities similar to those faced by the fellow servant. Saying,
"The reasons for the old rule no longer obtaining, the rule falls with it," the Michigan
Supreme Court abolished the volunteer doctrine. James v. Alberts, 464 Mich. 12, 18, 626
N.W.2d 158, 162 (2001).
31. Myers v. Genesee County Auditor, 375 Mich. 1, 133 N.W.2d 190 (1965).
32. Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 405 Mich. 638, 657, 275 N.W.2d 511, 517
(1979).
33. Bricker v. Green, 313 Mich. 218, 21 N.W.2d 105 (1946).
34. Parker v. Port Huron Hosp., 361 Mich. 1, 105 N.W.2d 1 (1960).
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husband's consortium;35 abrogated the defense of assumption of risk, which
had been applied outside of the employment area;3 6 held that there could be
recovery for pre-natal injuries;3 7 and finally abolished contributory
negligence as a complete bar to recovery in favor of a comparative
negligence approach.3"
In these cases the court discussed the relevant policy considerations
influencing its decisions with respect to the common law rule at issue. With
respect to the elimination of the imputed negligence doctrine, the court
stated:
Ever since 1872 we have adhered to the imputed negligence rule.
We have recognized from time to time the changes brought about
by the innovations of science and engineering, and we have
carefully considered at much length the implications of the rule, its
application, and the effect of its abandonment. As a result of our
study and observation we are convinced that in the long run the
application of the rule is more harmful than helpful and result in
more injustice than it prevents.39
The justifications for eliminating charitable immunity as a defense to a tort
action were that charitable immunity itself was an exception to the general
rule of tort liability, that the historical basis for the rule was that it was
deemed to advance a sound public policy, and that the reasons for and the
consequences of charitable immunity are "not convincing in the light of
modem conditions, both in the law and in philanthropy." 40 In modem times
insurance against tort liability was available to charities, so there was no
danger of dissipation of the charity's assets if it was subject to tort liability.
Weighted against this was the cost of the victim of bearing the full burden
of his injury, so that the arguments for sustaining charitable immunity, "no
longer have, if they ever had, compelling effect."'4
The court's holding that a wife could now maintain an action for the
loss of her husband's consortium was premised on modem principles of
equality of the sexes in the marriage relationship, so that the common law
rule allowing a husband to recover for the loss of his wife's consortium was
35. Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich. 33, 101 N.W.2d 227 (1960).
36. Feigner v. Anderson, 375 Mich. 23, 133 N.W.2d 136 (1964).
37. Womack v. Buchhom, 384 Mich. 718, 187 N.W.2d 218 (1971).
38. Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 405 Mich. 638, 275 N.W.2d 511 (1979).
39. Bricker, 313 Mich. at 235, 21 N.W.2d at 111.
40. Parker, 361 Mich. at 16, 105 N.W.2d at 9.
41. Id. at 18-19, 105 N.W.2d at 10.
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extended in the "line of growth" to allow a wife to recover for the loss of
her husband's consortium.4 2 Its holding that a child could recover for pre-
natal injuries the court recognized that "[l]egal philosophy and precedent
have moved in response to scientific and popular knowledge," and
concluded that "Michigan should recognize what present day science,
philosophy and the great weight of the law in this country consider the
better and the sound rule. 43 The court's abrogation of the defense of
assumption of risk emphasized that the historical basis of the doctrine was
to protect the employer from liability to the employee for work-related
injuries, so that the utility of the doctrine was drastically restricted by the
adoption of a worker's compensation law," and that the doctrine served
only to relieve a defendant of the legal consequences of his own negligent
acts on the theory that the plaintiff assumed the risk of injuries from such
negligent acts.45
Perhaps the most extensive discussion of policy in these cases was in
Placek v. City of Sterling Heights,46 where the court abolished contributory
negligence as a complete bar in favor of a comparative negligence
approach. The court began by noting that, "[t]here is little dispute among
legal commentators that the doctrine of contributory negligence has caused
substantial injustice since it was first invoked in England in 1809," and that
it had been discarded in almost every common law jurisdiction outside of
the United States, and by that time had been rejected in favor of some form
of comparative negligence in the clear majority of American states.47 The
court next emphasized that in all the other cases discussed above, the court
had exercised a "corrective responsibility" when dealing with judge-made
42. As the court stated in Montgomery:
The Married Women's Acts and common constitutional provisions have wrought
a revolutionary change. Legally, today the wife stands on a par with her husband.
Factually, as we well know, her position is no less than that of an equal partner.
The precedents of the older cases are not valid precedents. They are violative of
women's statutory rights and constitutional safeguards. They are out of harmony
with the conditions of modem society. They do violence to our convictions and
our principles. We reject their applicability. The reasons for the old rule no longer
obtaining, the rule falls with it. The obstacles to the wife's action were judge-
invented and they are herewith judge-destroyed.
Montgomery, 359 Mich. at 49, 101 N.W.2d at 234.
43. Womack, 384 Mich. at 724, 187 N.W.2d at 222.
44. Felgner v. Anderson, 375 Mich. 23, 41, 133 N.W.2d 136, 146 (1964).
45. Id. at 44, 133 N.W.2d at 147. The application of the doctrine also created confusion
with the doctrine of contributory negligence and with the question of whether the
defendant's activity amounted to negligence in the first place.
46.405 Mich. 635, 652, 275 N.W.2d 511, 515 (1979).
47. Id. at 651, 275 N.W.2d at 514.
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law.48 Then the court dealt with the question of whether it was appropriate
for the courts, rather than the legislature, to change the common law rule of
contributory negligence in favor of a rule of comparative negligence. Here
the court rejected the oft-asserted claim that the legislature had the superior
power of investigating important policy and making an informed choice
among available alternatives. 9 It pointed out that the same quantitative data
on the impact of comparative negligence on insurance rates and on the
processing of claims by settlement that was available to the legislature was
likewise available to judges.5 0 In addition, the claim that the legislature
could enact change and simultaneously anticipate the numerous details and
collateral issues was refuted by the fact that almost all comparative
negligence statutes were brief and assigned the courts the responsibility of
dealing with ancillary questions." Finally, the courts could deal with issues
of planning and insurability by making decisions that changed the common
law prospective in application. 2 Thus, the court concluded that the courts
were "certainly in as good, if not better, a position to evaluate the need for
change, and to fashion that change."53
C. The Last Quarter-Century: The Question of Where Policy
Considerations Lead
In Berger v. Weber,54 decided two years after Placek, a sharply divided
Michigan Supreme Court held that Michigan would recognize a common
law action by a child for loss of a parent's consortium caused by a negligent
injury, making Michigan only the second state to do so at that time. What
is significant about Berger for present purposes is that both the majority and




52. Placek, 405 Mich. at 657, 275 N.W.2d at 517.
53. Id. at 659, 275 N.W.2d at 518. The court in Placek adopted a pure comparative
negligence approach, under which the plaintiff's recovery is reduced by the percentage of
the plaintiff's own fault, so that, for example a plaintiff who is deemed 60% at fault and who
suffered $100,000 in damages still will recover $40,000. The court noted that the Michigan
Legislature "has the power to reinstate contributory negligence or to modify this rule of
comparative negligence." Id. at 662 n.12, 275 N.W.2d at 520 n.12. In 1995, as part of the
process of tort reform, the Michigan Legislature provided for comparative negligence by
statute, and while retaining pure comparative negligence with respect to economic damages,
it prohibited recovery for non-economic damages where the plaintiff's proportion of fault
was greater than the aggregate fault of the other person or persons. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 600.2959 (West 2000 & Supp. 2007).
54. 411 Mich. 1, 303 N.W.2d 424 (1981).
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the dissent approached the issue almost entirely with reference to
considerations of policy. The majority opinion by Justice Kavanagh stated:
"We are satisfied that existing judicial and legislative policies warrant
recognizing a child's cause of action for loss of society and companionship
of a negligently injured parent."55 Looking to what we have called the "line
of growth" of the common law, the majority emphasized that allowing the
child to maintain a cause of action for loss of a parent's consortium
advanced the same interests that were advanced by allowing spouses to
maintain a cause of action for loss of the other spouses consortium, and that
children could recover for the loss of society and companionship of a parent
who was negligently killed under the wrongful death act. 6 The majority
rejected the defendant's argument that it should not recognize the cause of
action because of the economic burden to the public due to increased
insurance premiums, saying that compensating a child who has suffered
emotional problems because of the deprivation of a parent's love and
affection could provide the child with the means of adjustment to the loss,
and that since society would also benefit if the child is able to function
without emotional handicap, "this may well offset any increase in insurance
premiums."57
The dissent, in contrast, invoked policy considerations as a justification
for not recognizing the cause of action. Justice Levin, writing for the
dissenting justices, set out the policy arguments advanced on both sides of
the issue, and noted: "[d]ecisions delineating the extent of tort liability are,
however, more than exercises in logic. They are pronouncements of social
policy, which should reflect the often subtle balance of the interests
involved."58 This being so, Justice Levin stated that: "[t]oday we balance
the interest of an injured person's child in monetary redress for injury to the
parent-child relationship against the consequences of imposing yet another
potential liability upon a negligent defendant a liability the additional cost
of which will be spread among the citizens of the state through increased
insurance premiums."'9 The dissenters emphasized the anomaly of allowing
any action for loss of consortium-the plaintiff recovers damages for an
55. Id. at 13, 303 N.W.2d at 425.
56. Id. at 14-15, 303 N.W.2d at 425-26.
57. Id. at 15, 303 N.W.2d at 426. In response to the argument that the court should
"leave the matter to the legislature," the court observed that, "[a]t the present time, children
are prevented from recovering for loss of parental consortium by judicial decision," and
"[w]e do not regard the cause of action contemplated here so complex that we should defer
action to the Legislature." Id. at 17, 303 N.W.2d at 427.
58. Id. at 23-24, 303 N.W.2d at 430.
59. Berger, 411 Mich. at 24, 303 N.W.2d at 430.
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injury to another person-and said that this was a good reason for not
extending it beyond the marriage relationship to other relationships.6 The
dissent concluded as follows:
In concluding that the balance between the child's interest in
compensation for the lost society and companionship of an injured
parent and the tortfeasor's interest in freedom from additional
liability, with due consideration to the social consequences of each
alternative, weighs against recognition of a child's claim, we are
influenced by a number of considerations including the uncertainty
that recognizing the proposed cause of action will yield a
significant social benefit, the additional economic burden imposed
upon the general public by expanding recovery to a new category
of indirect injury likely to be associated with a large percentage of
accidents, the nature of the loss asserted, the lack of immediate
connection between the plaintiff and the defendant, and the
difficulty of objective demonstration and evaluation of the child's
injury.61
This case demonstrates very clearly not only that policy considerations
have always been a part of the development of the common law in
Michigan, but that members of the court can sharply disagree on the place
where policy leads the common law and on the result that follows from the
court's application of policy in the particular case. The matter of
disagreement over where policy leads in a particular case will surface again
in the discussion of Henry and a cause of action for medical monitoring.
The development of the common law in a line of growth and the
relevance of policy considerations in that development is illustrated by the
court's decisions in regard to comparative fault following its adoption of the
comparative fault approach in place of the contributory negligence
approach. In order to counter some of the harshness of the contributory
negligence approach, the Michigan Supreme Court grafted some exceptions
on to the contributory negligence doctrine, such as last clear chance and
gross negligence. With the abolition of the contributory negligence
approach, the court abrogated these doctrines too.62 In addition, the court,
asserting its "obligation to analyze and decide the issues presented by
applying the common-law principles of negligence developed in our prior
60. Id. at 29, 303 N.W.2d at 433.
61. Id.. at 33, 303 N.W.2d at 435.
62. See Jennings v. Southwood, 446 Mich. 125, 521 N.W.2d 230 (1994); Petrove v.
Grand Trunk W. R.R. Co., 437 Mich. 31, 464 N.W.2d 711 (1991).
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decisions in a consistent manner," held that evidence of a driver's failure to
use a seat belt was admissible in an automobile accident or products liability
case to show the driver's comparative fault.63
The development of the common law in a line of growth, and the
relevance of policy considerations in that development in Michigan, is
further illustrated by the application of the open and obvious doctrine by the
Michigan Supreme Court. The rationale of the open and obvious doctrine
is that the defendant should not be held liable for harm caused by a danger
that was open and obvious to the person suffering the harm. The doctrine
was first asserted by a manufacturer in a design defect case, where the claim
was that the design of a forklift was defective for failing to provide some
sort of factory-installed driver restraint that would have prevented the
driver's ejection during a rollover.' The manufacturer argued that it should
63. Lowe v. Estate Motors, Ltd., 428 Mich. 439,449,410 N.W.2d 706, 710 (1987). In
that case, which involved a products liability claim, the evidence of failure to use a seat belt
could also be introduced for the purpose of defending the crashworthiness design of the
vehicle.
The court also dealt with the fact that the Legislature had recently enacted mandatory
seat belt usage legislation, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.710e (West 2001), which
required drivers and front-seat passengers to wear seat belts and further provided that the
failure to use the seat belt in violation of the statute could be considered negligence, but that
such negligence would not reduce the plaintiff's recovery by more than 5%. The statute did
not apply to the case at bar, both because the accident occurred prior to the statute's
effective date and because the plaintiff was a rear seat passenger to whom the statute would
not apply. The court majority concluded that it should not engage in "legislative deference"
in deciding what the common law rule should be, and that it was appropriate for the court
to apply the comparative negligence doctrine to failure to use a seat belt without regard to
the legislative standard. The result was that in a tort suit, there were two alternative grounds
for admitting evidence of the failure to use a seat belt, the statute or the common law rule.
The difference was that when the evidence of failure to use a seat belt was admitted under
the statute, the 5% limit applied, but when the evidence was admitted under common law
negligence, neither the conditions of the statute nor the 5% limit applied. This difference
was discussed by the Michigan Supreme Court in Mann v. St. Clair County Road Comm'n,
470 Mich. 347, 350, 681 N.W.2d 653, 656 (2004). The court then went on to hold that the
statute's cap on the reduction of damages applied only to the limited tort actions that could
be brought under the no-fault act, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 500.3101-.3179 (West
2002). So, in the products liability or automobile accident case brought against the alleged
tortfeasor, the matter is governed by the common law comparative negligence doctrine, and
evidence of the failure to use a seat belt is admissible to show comparative fault on the part
of the driver or passenger and to reduce recovery accordingly. It should be noted in this
regard that the statute enacted to incorporate the court's change of the common law from a
contributory negligence to a comparative negligence approach, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 600.2959 (West 2000 & Supp. 2007), retains pure comparative negligence with respect to
economic damages, but prohibits recovery for non-economic damages where the plaintiff's
proportion of fault was greater than the aggregate fault of the other person or persons.
64. Owens v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 414 Mich. 413,425,326 N.W.2d 372,377 (1982).
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not be liable because the alleged defect was obvious to the driver of the
forklift.65 The court held that the open and obvious doctrine was
inapplicable in a design defect claim, stating that, "[o]bvious risks may be
unreasonable risks, and there is no justification for departing from general
negligence and breach of warranty principles merely because the dangers
are patent. '66 The court went on to say that, "[t]he test, however, is not
whether the risks are obvious, but whether the risks were unreasonable in
light of the foreseeable injuries. 67
However, the court next held that the doctrine was applicable in a
failure to warn case, where the claim was that the manufacturer of an above-
ground pool was negligent in failing to inform the user of the danger of a
headfirst dive into the shallow waters of the pool.68 The premises of duty to
warn liability in products cases, said the court, is that sellers have an
obligation to transmit safety-related information when they know or should
know that the buyer or user is unaware of that information.69 The court
concluded that the manufacturer had no duty to warn of open and obvious
dangers connected with the use of an otherwise non-defective product that
were discoverable upon casual inspection by the average user of ordinary
intelligence.7" In such a situation, the court concluded, the policies served
by duty to warn liability are absent, and for this reason there is no duty to
warn.
7 1
Once the court held that there was no duty to warn of open and obvious
dangers in products liability cases, it was a short step to extend the holding
to premises liability cases, and the Michigan Supreme Court did so. Here
the open and obvious doctrine was recast to include a "special aspects"
exception. Thus, the common law rule relating to the duty owned by an
owner of land to an invitee in Michigan is that the premises' possessors are
not required to protect the invitee from open and obvious dangers, but if
special aspects of a condition make even an open and obvious risk
unreasonably dangerous, the possessor has a duty to undertake reasonable
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. In regard to the reasonableness issue in the particular case, the Court observed
that the focus solely was on the forklift and that the question was whether a forklift was
unreasonably dangerous when it failed to include a factory-installed driver restraint such as
a seat belt or a cage enclosure. Id. at 428, 326 N.W.2d at 378.
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precautions to protect invitees from that risk.72 As the court explained the
doctrine in its application to premises liability:
[W]ith regard to open and obvious dangers, the critical question is
whether there is evidence that creates a genuine issue of material
fact regarding whether there are truly "special aspects" of the open
and obvious condition that differentiate the risk from typical open
and obvious risks . . . , i.e., whether the "special aspect" of the
condition should prevail in imposing liability upon the defendant
or the openness and obviousness of the condition should prevail in
barring liability.73
At the same time, the Court has recently held that the open and obvious
doctrine did not apply to negligence claims against a general contractor with
respect to a common work area.74 In this situation, two common law
doctrines, the common work area doctrine, and the open and obvious
doctrine, which are founded on different policy considerations, appeared to
clash. Under the common work area doctrine in Michigan, the general
contractor on a construction project has the duty to assure that reasonable
steps, within its supervising and coordinating authority, are taken to guard
against readily observable and avoidable dangers in common work areas
that create a high degree of risk to a substantial number of workers.75 In
order for the general contractor to be liable under the common work area
doctrine for the negligence of the employees of independent subcontractors
with respect to job site safety, the plaintiff must show that the general
contractor failed to take reasonable steps within its supervisory and
coordinating authority to guard against readily observable and avoidable
dangers, and that the general contractor's failure to do so created a high
degree of risk to a significant number of workers in a common work area.76
The policy reasons for the common work area doctrine are that in many
72. Lugo v. Ameritech Corp., Inc., 464 Mich. 512, 517, 629 N.W.2d 384, 386 (2001).
The first case to apply the open and obvious doctrine to claims of premises liability was
Bertrand v. Alan Ford, Inc., 449 Mich. 606,537 N.W.2d 185 (1995). In that case, one of the
plaintiffs tripped on a step outside a park restroom, and the only basis for her claim was that
she failed to see the step. The court held that recovery was barred under the open and
obvious doctrine. In another case, again involving a fall from a step, the court found that
there was a question of fact concerning "special aspects," since "the construction of the step,
when considered with the placement of the vending machines and the cashier's window,
along with the hinging of the door, created an unreasonable risk of harm, despite the
obviousness of the invitee's knowledge of the danger of falling off the step." Id.. at 624, 537
N.W.2d at 192.
73. Lugo, 464 Mich. at 517-518, 629 N.W.2d at 387.
74. Ghaffari v. Turner Constr. Co., 473 Mich. 16, 699 N.W.2d 6877 (2005).
75. Funk v. General Motors Corp., 392 Mich. 91, 220 N.W.2d 641 (1974).
76. Ormsby v. Capital Welding, Inc., 471 Mich. 45, 54, 684 N.W.2d 320, 325-326
(2004).
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cases only the general contractor is in a position to coordinate the work or
provide expensive safety features that protect the employees of many or all
of the subcontractors, and that even if subcontractors and supervisory
employees are aware of safety violations, they are often unable to rectify the
situation themselves or are in too poor an economic position to compel their
superiors to do so. 7 And, of course, the individual employee must either
continue to work despite awareness of the safety violations or give up the
employment.
The court went on to say that there was an irreconcilable conflict
between the common work area doctrine and the open and obvious doctrine,
since the common work doctrine imposes an affirmative duty on the general
contractor to protect against open and obvious hazards on the construction
project, while the open and obvious doctrine imposes no duty on the
defendant if the hazards are open and obvious.78 The court then found that
the doctrines were distinct in that the open and obvious doctrine applied to
a premises' possessor, while the common work doctrine applied to a general
contractor whose responsibility it was to coordinate the activities of an array
of subcontractors and different duties were imposed under the different
doctrines.79 In addition, applying the open and obvious doctrine in the
construction setting would nullify the doctrine of comparative negligence
in that setting and would effectively restore the complete bar to a
contractor's liability that was abolished when comparative negligence
replaced contributory negligence.80 The court thus concluded that the open
and obvious doctrine has no applicability to a claim under the common
work area doctrine.8
D. Judicial Policymaking in Michigan: Some Further Observations
It has been demonstrated, therefore, that in the development of the
common law of Michigan, the Michigan Supreme Court has at all times
engaged in judicial policymaking. From the liability-limiting rules of the
late nineteenth century designed to protect the newly-emerging industries
in this state, to the court's exercise of its power to change the common law
in Michigan over a thirty year period by expanding significantly the scope
of tort liability in Michigan, to its recognition of new claims, such as a
child's right to recover for loss of a parent's consortium caused by a
negligent injury, to its imposition of limits on tort recovery, such as the
open and obvious doctrine, the court has invoked considerations of policy
77. Funk, 392 Mich. at 104, 220 N.W.2d at 646.
78. Ghaffari, 473 Mich. at 21, 699 N.W.2d at 691.
79. Id. at 23-24, 699 N.W.2d at 691-92.
80. Id. at 25-26, 699 N.W.2d at 693. Comparative negligence was held to replace
contributory negligence in the construction setting in Hardy v. Monsanto Enviro-Chem
Systems Inc., 414 Mich. 29, 323 N.W.2d 270 (1982).
81. Ghaffari, 473 Mich. at 25-26, 699 N.W.2d at 693.
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in support of its decisions. In these cases, the court's invocation of policy
considerations was sometimes accompanied by substantial disagreement
among members of the court over where policy should lead. Moreover, at
no time did the court ever suggest that separation of powers considerations
should somehow operate as a kind of prudential restraint on the court's use
of policy in the development of the common law, or on the court's ability
to promulgate common law rules that will bring about, to use Justice
Corrigan's term in Henry, a "dramatic reallocation of societal benefits and
burdens., 82 It is this judicial policymaking that has marked the development
of the common law throughout the United States. The history of the
development of the common law has been a history of judicial
policymaking, and as Oliver Wendell Holmes pointed out long ago: "Every
important principle which is developed by litigation is in fact and at bottom
the result of more or less definitely understood views of public policy."83
It is further submitted that Justice Young is quite wrong when he says
that policymaking is exclusively the province of the legislature, that the
courts cannot formulate common law rules that may have significant social
and economic effects, and that the courts should not make a "new and
potentially societally dislocating change to the common law., 84 There is
also disagreement with Justice Corrigan's contention that separation of
powers considerations may operate as a prudential bar to judicial
policymaking in the common law arena.85 Quite to the contrary, it is
submitted that the Michigan courts, in exercising the judicial power
conferred upon them by the Michigan Constitution, must develop the
common law of Michigan and, as necessary, engage in judicial
policymaking in the formulation of common law rules. The legislature has
the power to change the common law by legislation and to substitute its
policy choices for those that the court has made.86 But unless and until the
legislature has done so, it is the common law that determines the legal rights
and obligations of private persons in Michigan, and just as the legislature
makes policy choices in enacting legislation, the courts also make policy
choices in formulating the common law. This is their power and
responsibility under the Michigan Constitution.87
82. Henry, 473 Mich. 63, 701 N.W.2d 684.
83. Holmes, THE COMMON LAW, supra note 22.
84. Young, "State Jurisprudence, the Role of the Courts and the Rule of Law, "supra,
note 6.
85. Henry, 473 Mich. at 88, 701 N.W.2d at 697.
86. Thus, the courts cannot promulgate a common law rule that expressly conflicts with
the provisions of legislation, nor may they formulate a common law rule in an area that has
been effectively preempted by legislation. See the discussion, supra, note 15, and
accompanying text.
87. As stated previously, the difference between what the courts do and what the
legislature does is a difference in process, not a difference in substance.
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Il. THE MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT DECISION IN HENRY V. Dow CHEMICAL
We now turn to the Michigan Supreme Court's decision in Henry v.
Dow Chemical.88 This was a class action brought by plaintiffs seeking to
represent a putative class of thousands against Dow Chemical. The core
allegation was that Dow's plant in Midland, Michigan, negligently released
dioxin, a synthetic chemical that is potentially hazardous to human health,
into the Tittabawasee flood plain where the plaintiffs and the putative class
members lived and worked. The plaintiffs asked the court to certify a class
that collectively sought the creation of a program, to be funded by the
defendant and supervised by the court, that would monitor the class and
their representatives for possible future manifestations of dioxin-related
disease.89
The court held that the plaintiffs' medical monitoring claim was not
cognizable under Michigan law.9" The court said that the claim was not a
viable claim for negligence as it currently existed because the plaintiffs did
not allege a present physical injury,91 and the court was unwilling to modify
Michigan's common law to encompass a cause of action for medical
monitoring.
Although recognizing that "the common law is an instrument that may
change as times and circumstances require," the court stated that it would
not alter the common law of negligence liability to encompass a cause of
action for medical monitoring.92 The court gave two reasons in support of
its decision. First, the court said that recognition of a medical monitoring
claim would involve extensive fact-finding and the weighing of numerous
and conflicting policy concerns, and that the court lacked sufficient
informaticn to assess intelligently and fully the potential consequences of
recognizing a medical monitoring claim.93 Second, and equally important
said the court, was that:
[P]laintiffs have asked this Court to effect a change in Michigan
88. Henry, 473 Mich. at 88, 701 N.W.2d at 697.
89. The facts are taken from the court's opinion. Henry, 473 Mich. at 67, 701 N.W.2d
at 685-686.
90. Id. at 82, 701 N.W.2d at 694.
91. As to the first point, the court said that under well-established common law
principles, the imposition of tort liability requires a showing of a present physical injury to
persons or property, and at this point in time, the release of dioxin into the flood plain has
not caused present physical injury to the plaintiffs. Id. Tort liability should not be extended
to the possibility of future harm that may never occur. 1d. The only injury that the plaintiffs
presently were suffering was the fear of a future illness and the costs of medical monitoring,
which were not sufficient to satisfy the requirement of a present physical injury. Id. The
court thus concluded that the plaintiff's claim for medical monitoring could not stand under
the common law of negligence as it currently existed in Michigan. Id.
92. Henry, 473 Mich. at 68, 701 N.W.2d at 686.
93. Id.
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law that, in our view, ought to be made, if at all by the legislature
... [and] [a]s a matter of prudence, we defer in this case to the
people's representatives in the Legislature, who are better suited to
undertake the complex task of balancing the competing societal
interests at stake.94
With respect to the first reason, the court said that judicial recognition
of such a claim based solely on exposure without a requirement of present
injury could have "undesirable effects that neither we nor the parties can
satisfactorily predict," such as creating a potentially limitless pool of
plaintiffs and draining resources needed to compensate those with manifest
physical injuries and a more immediate need for medical care.95 The court
went on to say that it was not clear that the benefits of a medical monitoring
cause of action would outweigh the burdens imposed on plaintiffs with
manifest injuries, the judicial system, and those responsible for
administering and financing medical care.96 Because of the asserted need for
extensive fact-finding and the weighing of numerous and conflicting policy
concerns, the court concluded that, "we do not believe that the instant
question is one suitable for resolution by the judicial branch."97
The dissenting justices argued that the plaintiffs did suffer actual harm
and damages in the form of heightened exposure to dioxin that they had
received because of defendant's acts and that if it were not for defendant's
acts, plaintiffs would not have been advised to incur the expenses involved
in additional testing for early detection of any illnesses caused by the
increased dioxin exposure. The defendant should be responsible for paying
for the costs of the tests, they said, because the defendant was responsible
for the need for the test.98 The dissenting justices obviously did not share
the majority's concerns about the unpredictable consequences that could
result from recognizing a cause of action for medical monitoring. The
dissent argued that this was a clear case of heightened exposure to a
dangerous substance that caused harm to particular plaintiffs, that
94. Id. at 68-69, 701 N.W.2d at 686. The court noted that the legislature had already
established policy in this area by delegating the responsibility for dealing with the health
risks stemming from industrial pollution to the Michigan Department of Environmental
Quality.
95. Id. at 83, 701 N.W.2d at 694.
96. Id. at 84, 701 N.W.2d at 694-95.
97. Id., 701 N.W.2d at 695.
98. Id. at 107-08, 701 N.W.2d 707 (dissenting opinion). The dissent pointed out that
the plaintiffs had been exposed to dioxin at over 80 times the level deemed safe for direct
residential contact and that routine activities, such as flower gardening and lawn work could
further increase their risk of dioxin exposure. They were advised that they should not allow
their children to play in the soil to avoid further contamination. Unlike any exposure to
dioxin, these plaintiffs are at much greater risk than other persons. Because of the prolonged
exposure to high levels of dioxin, a doctor may, according to accepted scientific principles,
find that such tests are reasonably necessary to best monitor and treat a patient.
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recognizing a cause of action for medical monitoring on these facts would
not allow a claim for medical monitoring resulting from any kind of harmful
exposure, and that the plaintiffs were seeking only a limited remedy for the
harm caused by the defendant. 99 And other courts have recognized a cause
of action for medical monitoring along the lines of the claim asserted by the
plaintiffs in Henry.'00
At this point in the opinion, the result can be explained in terms of a
sharp difference between the majority and the dissent over the place where
policy leads the common law and on the result that follows from the court's
application of policy in the particular case. We saw this kind of sharp policy
disagreement among the members of the court in Berger v. Weber,'0 ' on the
question of whether Michigan should recognize a common law action by a
child for loss of a parent's consortium. °2 These disagreements are also
reflected in the dissenting opinions in some other cases where the Michigan
Supreme Court made changes in the common law of Michigan, such as
when it abolished charitable immunity, 1°3 and when it held that a wife could
maintain a tort action for loss of her husband's consortium."°4 This would
simply be another case where the Michigan courts, in exercising the judicial
power conferred upon them by the Michigan Constitution, have developed
the common law of Michigan and as necessary, have engaged in judicial
policymaking in the formulation of common law rules. The majority's
application of judicial policymaking in Henry led to its conclusion that
considerations of policy should cause it to refuse to recognize a cause of
action for medical monitoring.
But the court did not stop at this point. Instead, Justice Corrigan,
writing for the court, invoked the hitherto unknown proposition that
"separation of powers considerations may operate as a prudential bar to
judicial policy-making in the common-law arena."'0 5 According to Justice
Corrigan, "[t]his is so when we are asked to modify the common law in a
way that may lead to dramatic reallocation of societal benefits and
burdens."'' 0 6 With all due respect, there is nothing in constitutional
separation of powers considerations that imposes any kind of limitation on
the constitutional responsibility of the Michigan Supreme Court to
promulgate the common law of Michigan, and as necessary, to engage in
judicial policymaking in the process of doing so. As has been demonstrated
99. Henry, 473 Mich. at 106-21, 701 N.W.2d at 707-715 (dissenting opinion).
100. See Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970 (Utah 1993); Bower v.
Westinghouse Electric Corp., 206 W.Va. 133, 522 S.E.2d 424 (1999).
101. Berger, 411 Mich. 1,303 N.W.2d 424.
102. See the discussion, supra note 57, and accompanying text.
103. Parker, 361 Mich.1, 105 N.W.2d 1. The decision in that case was 4-3.
104. Montgomery, 359 Mich. 33, 101 N.W.2d 227. The decision in that case was also
4-3.
105. Henry, 473 Mich. at 89, 701 N.W.2d at 697.
106. Id. at 89, 701 N.W.2d at 697.
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repeatedly, the history of the development of the common law has been a
history of judicial policymaking. Justice Corrigan's concern about the
court's "modify[ing] the common law in a way that may lead to dramatic
reallocation of societal benefits and burdens 10 7 completely ignores the
"dramatic reallocation of society benefits and burdens"' 8 that took place in
Michigan when the court, beginning in the middle of the twentieth century,
abandoned the tort liability-limiting rules of the late nineteenth century that
had been promulgated to protect the newly-emerging industries (and that
put the burden of industrial accidents on victims and employees, thereby
benefitting manufacturers and employers), and expanded significantly the
scope of tort liability in Michigan. As this process was taking place, it was
never suggested that separation of powers concerns had any relevance at all
when the court was exercising its constitutional responsibility to promulgate
the common law of Michigan, or that somehow the court was to defer to the
legislature and avoid engaging in "judicial policymaking."'1 9 Again with all
due respect, there is strong disagreement with Justice Corrigan's position
that separation of powers considerations in any way preclude the court from
engaging in "judicial policymaking" as it promulgates the common law of
Michigan.
As has been discussed earlier, separation of powers considerations
constrain the power of the courts to promulgate common law rules in two
ways. First and most obviously, since under the Michigan Constitution
legislation takes precedence over the common law, the courts may not
formulate a common law rule the expressly conflicts with the provisions of
legislation. Second, the courts may not properly promulgate a common law
rule that has been effectively preempted by legislation. But that is all. It is
the legislature's constitutional responsibility to legislate. It is the court's
constitutional responsibility to promulgate common law rules. So long as
there is no express conflict between legislation and a common law rule, and
so long as there has been no preemption, the courts may promulgate
common law rules regulating the rights of private persons in areas where the
legislature has enacted regulatory legislation.
In a case such as Henry, where the court holds, as it did in the first part
of the Henry opinion, that policy considerations preclude recognition of a
new kind of tort liability, it follows that if such liability is going to be
imposed, it will have to be imposed by the legislature. But this is not
because the court has somehow deferred to the legislature with respect to
the matter in issue. It is because the court has refused to promulgate a new
common law rule at the present time. Liability could be imposed by
legislation if the legislature decides to impose such liability at a future time,
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. The court emphasized that "rules created by the court could be altered by the
court," and that the court "had a corrective responsibility when dealing with judge-made
law." Placek, 405 Mich. at 657, 275 N.W.2d at 517.
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or it could be imposed by the court at a future time if the court considers the
matter anew.
In Henry, the court made much of the fact that the legislature had
provided a method for dealing with the negligent emission of toxic
substances by giving the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality
broad regulatory authority to deal with the kind of environmental and health
risks brought about by Dow's alleged emission of dioxin into the
Tittabawassee flood plain.110 The court said that the plaintiffs were asking
the court to create a cause of action for medical monitoring where the
legislature has already signaled its preference with respect to the appropriate
form a remedy should take. The court concluded that, "[i]n deference to the
policy-making branch of our government, we decline to create this
alternative remedial regime. 1 .
This statement, it is submitted, is inconsistent with the constitutional
responsibility of the Michigan Supreme Court to promulgate the common
law of Michigan. In the exercise of its constitutional responsibility to
promulgate the common law of Michigan, the Michigan Supreme Court
must, and throughout its history has, engage in judicial policymaking.
Under our constitutional scheme then, both the Michigan Legislature and
the court engage in policymaking. The difference between what the court
does and what the legislature does is a difference in process, not a
difference in substance. The court engages in policymaking through the
judicial process while the legislature engages in policymaking through the
legislative process. While the processes are quite different, they are both
provided for under the Michigan Constitution, and the court cannot abandon
its constitutional responsibility to promulgate the common law merely
because the legislature also has legislated with respect to the matter in issue.
Since allowing a cause of action for medical monitoring for toxic harm
would in no way interfere with the legislative scheme for dealing with the
negligent emission of toxic substances such as dioxin, it is entirely
appropriate for the court to promulgate a common law rule recognizing such
a claim.
But as has been discussed previously, the Michigan Supreme Court in
Henry set forth valid policy reasons for refusing to promulgate a common
law rule recognizing a cause of action for medical monitoring. The dissent
argued that policy reasons justified the promulgation of such a rule. The
courts can disagree over questions of where policy should lead, as they can
disagree over any other question, but this disagreement, as disagreement in
other areas, in no way affects the appropriateness ofjudicial policymaking.
110. Henry, 473 Mich. 63, 701 N.W.2d 684.
111. Id. at 95, 701 N.W.2d at 701.
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IV. CONCLUSION
It is submitted, therefore, that it is the responsibility of the Michigan
Supreme Court to promulgate the common law of Michigan, and when it is
necessary to do so, to engage in judicial policymaking. It is not consistent
with the constitutional responsibility of the Michigan Supreme Court to
defer to the legislature and to refuse to promulgate an otherwise appropriate
common law rule on the ground that this "may lead to a dramatic
reallocation of societal benefits and burdens." It may be hoped that the part
of the Henry opinion proposing such deference will be regarded as an
unnecessary aberration and will not become a part of the constitutional law
of this state.
